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INTRODUCING THE TWO AND A HALF HURDLES FROM THE 
EUROZONE TO U.S. COURTS 
he recent financial unrest in Europe has created signifi-
cant distressed opportunities. Buyers with free capital 
have been able to obtain significant quantities of distressed as-
sets at free fall pricing. In a typical arms-length transaction, 
these buyers would leave without further concern for the viabil-
ity of their counterparties. But these parties may soon find 
themselves reacquainted with their sweetheart deals if their 
counterparties fail to weather financial depressions and seek 
bankruptcy protection before the waves subside. 
When storms settle and economies improve, assets whose 
values were temporarily distressed often experience a sudden 
rebound in value. Such price fluctuations create incentives for 
counterparties to reclaim assets that once seemed like broken 
glass, but now appear to be crown jewels. Fraudulent transfer 
laws, which date back to the Statute of Elizabeth in the six-
teenth-century,1 allow courts to unwind transactions after the 
fact. Before June 2011, U.S. bankruptcy courts regularly used 
fraudulent transfer provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code 
(“the Code”)2 to reach domestic transactions with little fanfare.3 
But recent shifts in domestic jurisprudence may affect U.S. 
                                                                                                                         
* B.B.A., in Finance cum laude, Baylor University Hankamer School of Busi-
ness; J.D., cum laude, SMU Dedman School of Law; Managing Editor of The 
International Lawyer (2012–2013). He will be serving as a judicial clerk for 
the Honorable D. Michael Lynn, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of 
Texas. The author would like to thank Chris D. Wallis, CEO & CIO of 
Vaughan Nelson Investment Management, for his prophetic discussions 
about Europe; Omar J. Alaniz, Special Counsel at Baker Botts, LLP, for shar-
ing (and debating) his research and interpretation of Stern v. Marshall; and 
Mary, his wife and CEO of the Springer Household, for her patience and sup-
port. 
 1. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571) (Eng.). 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2006). 
 3. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 
318, 320–21 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“For over twenty-five years, my col-
leagues and I have operated with the understanding that we were properly 
constituted judges . . . I have entered countless orders as final without a sec-
ond thought about the legitimacy . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
T
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bankruptcy courts’ ability to exercise both jurisdiction and con-
stitutional authority over domestic and foreign transfers. 
This Article discusses the link between the debt crisis in the 
Eurozone and a potential flood of future litigation to unwind 
foreign transactions in U.S. courts. Specifically, this article will 
address the two and a half hurdles litigants must overcome to 
reach foreign transactions with U.S. bankruptcy law. Part II 
will briefly describe how economic forces created these dis-
tressed opportunities in the Eurozone. Part III will discuss how 
improving global economies create incentives for fraudulent 
transfer actions in U.S. courts and analyze a recent example. 
Part IV will outline how the 2005 Amendments to the Code, an 
ensuing circuit split over extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the 
Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Stern v. Marshall have 
created the two and a half hurdles. Finally, Part V will offer 
arguments for litigants to overcome or to defend the hurdles to 
U.S. adjudication. 
I. REASON FOR CONCERN: DISTRESSED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 
EUROZONE 
A. Economic Woes in the Eurozone 
As a harbinger of the 2008 financial crisis, Warren Buffet 
was famously quoted as saying: “It’s only when the tide goes 
out that you can see who’s swimming naked.”4 The financial 
tides accompanying the aftershocks of the 2008 financial de-
pression uncovered considerable concern for the bare balance 
sheets across the Eurozone. A severe debt crisis stemming from 
the banking and property bubbles led to liquidity constraints, 
defaults, and downgrades across the Eurozone; most notably in 
Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain.5 Persistent fiscal 
profligacy led to two separate sovereign bailouts for Greece, in 
a union too big to fail.6 The ripple effects of these financial woes 
                                                                                                                         
 4. America’s Economy: Danger Time for America, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 746681. 
 5. See Harriet Torry, Germany Approves Cyprus Bailout, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 19, 2013, at A12; Marcus Walker, Budget Treaty: Neither Panacea Nor 
Poison, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2012, at A8. 
 6. See id. Aside from pejorative characterizations, “too big to fail” means 
that the aggregate gross domestic product (“GDP”) of a country is smaller 
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have reached private sector sources of liquidity, forcing both 
private and public financial institutions alike to seek liquidity 
from a consortium of international investors.7 These efforts are 
to fill an estimated balance-sheet shortfall of €1 to 1.3 trillion 
for Europe’s major banks.8 In January 2012, one expert esti-
mated that the Eurozone needed approximately €3 trillion of 
fresh capital to create sufficient liquidity.9 
To correct the gap between book value and the actual value of 
the bad assets, the Eurozone must face a significant deleverag-
ing process.10 Europe has three basic options for deleveraging: 
(1) raise money, (2) print money, or (3) default and deflate.11 
The third option of markdowns provides immediate relief, but 
carries significant consequences, including potentially re-
igniting global financial panic.12 The European Central Bank 
(“ECB”) appeared to have adopted the second option by the 
spring of 2012, when it began flooding Europe’s banks with 
more than half a trillion euros of fresh capital.13 Despite the 
increased lending and artificially-fixed low rates, many of Eu-
rope’s major banks have refused to accept funds, opting instead 
                                                                                                                         
than the potential liabilities of a particular market sector, which is most of-
ten the financial or banking sector of an economy. 
 7. See Alkman Granitsas et. al., Greece Passes Sweeping Cuts, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 13, 2012, at A1. 
 8. Telephone Interview with Chris D. Wallis, Chief Exec. Officer & Chief 
Inv. Officer, Vaughan Nelson Inv. Mgt. (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Wallis 
Interview]; Chris Wallis, Chief Exec. Officer & Chief Inv. Officer, Vaughan 
Nelson Inv. Mgt., Presentation to the Baylor Angel Network: Investment 
Risks Inherent in Global Economic Rebalancing (Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter 
Presentation to BAN]. 
 9. Wallis Interview, supra note 8. 
 10. See STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR 
SPECULATIVE INVESTORS 207 (2005). Deleveraging is the process by which a 
company or country reduces the amount of debt or “leverage” from its balance 
sheet. Id. 
 11. Wallis Interview, supra note 8. Under the “default and deflate” option, 
Europe could have gambled systemic risk either by immediately marking the 
bad assets’ values down to market value or by accepting an estimated 20% 
deflation annually for three to five years. Id. Either result would have the 
opposite outcome of the first two options: a decreasing money supply. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Geoffrey T. Smith, ECB Chief Says Bank Helped Avert Disaster, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2012, at A9. 
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for private investment and off-balance sheet restructurings.14 If 
the situation deteriorates and remedial measures prove insuffi-
cient, the United States could even take drastic measures to 
insulate and protect itself, which would leave Europe more 
vulnerable to take the leverage hemlock alone.15 
In coordination with the ECB’s central funding efforts, the 
Eurozone countries have also completed member-funded 
bailouts of troubled Eurozone countries.16 The second round of 
bailouts for Greece in February 2012 staved off another poten-
tially chaotic liquidity crisis that would have threatened de-
faults by other member nations, such as Spain and Italy. Ger-
man Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble called for significant 
austerity measures and reforms amidst concern that increasing 
financial ties with Greece would threaten “[Germany’s] ability 
to pay for pensions and health care in an aging society.”17 Ger-
many insisted throughout the negotiations that Greece adopt 
austerity measures, tighten public spending, and improve on 
tax collection.18 Leaders of the twenty-five EU governments 
agreed on January 31, 2012, to provide Greece with approxi-
mately €130 billion (US$171.5 billion) of aid, which included 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund.19 In return, 
the Greek Parliament agreed to significant austerity measures, 
yielding to the German-led charge for tighter fiscal discipline.20 
These measures included “steep cuts in private-sector wages, 
sacking 15,000 public-sector workers and drumming up anoth-
er [three] billion euros in government-spending cuts [in 
2012].”21 
                                                                                                                         
 14. See David Enrich, Some Europe Banks Shun ECB Loans, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 7, 2012, at C1. 
 15. See Wallis Interview, supra note 8. One such drastic measure could 
involve nationalization of key U.S banks to consolidate U.S. balance sheets 
amidst the turmoil created by a potential immediate deleveraging in Europe. 
Id. 
 16. Matthew Dalton et. al., Europe Reaches a Greek Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
21, 2012, at A1. 
 17. Marcus Walker et. al., Germany Warns Greece on Aid Funds, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 30, 2012, at A7. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Granitsas, supra note 7, at A1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
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The measures have caused considerable strife in both the 
Greek Parliament, where parties were expelled “for not toeing 
the party line,” and the streets of Athens, where protestors con-
tinued to oppose any cuts in Greece’s public spending.22 The 
spending cuts continued for 2013 budgets amid negotiations to 
reduce Greece’s debt to “manageable levels.”23 As in Greece, 
austerity measures across the Eurozone were met with similar 
hostilities as workers organized strikes in Spain and Portu-
gal.24 Cyprus too was forced to agree to overhaul its public fi-
nance system and restructure its two biggest banks in return 
for €10 billion ($13.05 billion) bailout from its international 
creditors.25 Although the negotiations remained precarious at 
the time, EU leaders accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on De-
cember 10, 2012, for their efforts.26 
In addition to the bickering among Eurozone countries over 
austerity and liquidity measures, the Eurozone faces a number 
of other ancillary barriers that threaten to hinder already weak 
economies. Amidst these liquidity disruptions—and perhaps 
because of the constraints—the Eurozone now faces the pro-
spect of exporting its pool of skilled labor, as many former Eu-
ropean colonies in Latin America have started to lure skilled 
professionals.27 The 2014 World Cup of soccer and 2016 Olym-
pic Games are creating considerable opportunities in Brazil, as 
                                                                                                                         
 22. Id. 
 23. Gabriele Steinhauser & Stephen Fidler, Lenders at Odds over Greek 
Debt, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A17. 
 24. Matt Moffett et. al, Big Europe Strikes Have Little Effect, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 15, 2012, at A11. 
 25. Torry, supra note 5, at A12. 
 26. Gabriele Steinhauser & Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, EU Bickering Paus-
es for Nobel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A12. One can only hope that the 
triumphant photo of French President François Hollande and German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel clasping hands in celebration of the prize is not looked 
upon in the future with similar disbelief as President George Bush’s infa-
mous “Mission Accomplished” photo. Compare Amid Tensions, Europe’s Lead-
ers Accept Peace Prize, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A1 (celebrating, in 2012, 
success in averting crises in the Eurozone), with Bob Kemper, Bush: Iraq War 
Won; But President Warns ‘Dangerous Work’ Lies Ahead in Global Terror 
Fight, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2003, at C1 (celebrating, in 2003, success in Iraq 
while a banner saying “Mission Accomplished” was visible in the back-
ground). 
 27. Richard Boudreaux & Paulo Prada, Europe Hit by Downgrades, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, at A1. 
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the country scrambles to build accommodations, venues, and 
airport terminals.28 Meanwhile, the Eurozone faces economic 
contractions, with GDP falling 1% to 1.5% in the fourth quarter 
of 2011 and “[a] steady unemployment rate across the region 
. . . [rising to] the highest level since the first quarter of 
2001.”29 Demonstrating a trend across the Eurozone, almost 
60% of the “37,000 Spanish citizens who left the country in 
2010 . . . emigrated to countries outside the European Union.”30 
If this trend continues, members of the EU must overcome de-
clining economic growth and increasing global competition with 
a diminishing skilled work force. 
B. Applying Traditional Definitions of Distressed Assets to the 
Eurozone 
The confluences of the liquidity crisis, infighting over austeri-
ty measures, and increased financial ties across the Eurozone 
have created distressed opportunities for buyers with free capi-
tal. Distressed opportunities exist in many forms; in fact, 
“[t]here is no universally recognized definition of distressed 
debt.”31 Four general definitions often guide the term, including 
(1) third-party ratings, (2) liquidity availability, (3) debt 
spreads, and (4) debt and equity nominal trading values. 
Rating agencies, the most common prognosticators of finan-
cial strength, are third-party companies that independently 
assess investment quality.32 The major rating agencies use dif-
ferent labels to describe a ten-grade system that places bonds 
below a certain category as being “junk.”33 Ratings affect a 
company’s ability to raise capital as ratings below a certain 
level prevent certain investors, such as pension and endow-
                                                                                                                         
 28. See id. 
 29. Ilona Billington, Contraction Threat Clouds Euro Zone, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 1, 2012, at A10. 
 30. Boudreaux & Prada, supra note 27, at A1 (emphasis added). 
 31. MOYER, supra note 10, at 6. 
 32. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
Competition and Credit Ratings Agencies, at 5–6, DAF/COMP (2010) 29 (Oct. 
5, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/46825342.pdf. 
The three major rating agencies, which together control more than 90% of the 
market, include Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch 
IBCA. Id. at 12. 
 33. MOYER, supra note 10, at 6. 
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ment funds, from investing in the company’s debt or equity se-
curities. But the rating agencies have been severely criticized 
for their failure to assess companies’ financial viability accu-
rately, most notably in the wake of Enron and the structured 
investments leading to the 2008 financial crisis.34 
Unfortunately, without sufficient oversight, ratings may be 
driven—or at least delayed—by politics as much as financial 
strength.35 For instance, the long-expected Eurozone down-
grades in 2012 were received with little significant reaction in 
the markets.36 S&P and Fitch lowered ratings across the Euro-
zone in January, and Moody’s followed suit in February 2012, 
lowering the ratings of six European nations, and additionally 
warning that the United Kingdom may also face downgrades.37 
The downgrades continued throughout 2012 as major banks 
began to boost their cash reserves.38 
Compared to the holistic purview of ratings, a liquidity ap-
proach considers discrete events that cause a company or a 
country to be unable to meet its financial obligations. Such sit-
uations may be created when “cheap credit, and not value-
added products, drives a nation’s economy or a company’s pro-
duction.”39 When market forces, trade partners, or critical deci-
sions withdraw, or even simply interrupt, the means of imme-
diate liquidity, debt becomes distressed due to a lack of short-
term viability. For example, before investment banks changed 
structures to borrow directly from the U.S. Federal Reserve, 
Bear Stearns became distressed (and ultimately deceased) 
when counter-parties withdrew all forms of liquidity.40 
                                                                                                                         
 34. See Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron, 
35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2003). 
 35. Cf. Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regu-
latory Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 472–73 (2010) (discussing the political 
battle over reforming the ratings process). 
 36. Drew FitzGerald & Stephen L. Bernard, Moody’s Warns U.K. on Out-
look, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2012, at A8; David Gauthier-Villars & Charles 
Forelle, Europe Hit by Downgrades, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, at A1. 
 37. FitzGerald & Bernard, supra note 36; Gauthier-Villars & Forelle, su-
pra note 36. 
 38. E.g., David Enrich, Large European Banks Stash Cash, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 13, 2012, at C1. 
 39. Wallis Interview, supra note 8. 
 40. Susanne Craig et. al, Lehman Faces Mounting Pressures, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 10, 2008, at A1. 
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The two remaining definitions of distressed require a more 
analytical approach. A cost-of-debt approach defines a security 
as distressed when the spread between the risk-free rate and 
the company’s debt exceeds 1000 basis points.41 The “risk-free 
rate” is the rate that investors would expect to earn in a theo-
retical risk-free environment for a given period, often estimated 
to be the yield on U.S. Treasury Bills. According to this ap-
proach, the major Eurozone debts would have been nearing dis-
tressed levels as early as September 2009.42 The same determi-
nation would result under the trading values approach, which 
considers the nominal trading value of a security. Typical 
hallmarks of financial distress under this approach include a 
de minimis equity value or debt trading at a significant dis-
count.43 Under this definition, Greece’s sovereign debt would 
have qualified as distressed in December 2011 because esti-
mated recovery for bondholders was thirty-two cents on the eu-
ro.44 
C. Examples of Distressed Deals Already Made in the Eurozone 
The traditional definitions of distressed debt demonstrate 
that the Eurozone was likely distressed for a significant period 
before the rating agencies issued downgrades.45 During this 
unannounced period of distress, several lucrative transactions 
closed. On one such occasion, Ireland’s most wealthy citizen, 
Sean Quinn, chose to invest heavily in the Anglo Irish Bank 
                                                                                                                         
 41. MOYER, supra note 10, at 7 (citing Jean Helwege & Paul Kleiman, Un-
derstanding Aggregate Default Rates of High Yield Bonds, CURRENT ISSUES 
ECO. & FIN., May 1996, at 1, 5–6 (1996)). 
 42. See Richard Barley, Europe Dodges Worst of Ratings Mess, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 4, 2009, at C10. The 10-Year T-Bill rate in September 2009 was be-
tween 3% and 3.5%, which would mean that distressed debt levels started at 
an approximately 13% yield. See Daily Treasury Bill Rates, U.S. DEP’T 
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
center/interest-rates/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (select 
“Daily Treasury Bill Rates” and use drop-down lists to select “2009”). 
 43. MOYER, supra note 10, at 7. A typical equity marker would be a stock 
trading for less than US$1 per share, and a typical debt indicator would be a 
discount of 40% or greater from face value. Id. 
 44. See Greece Government Bond 10Y, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/government-bond-yield (last visited 
Apr. 24, 2013). 
 45. See Barley, supra note 42; Gauthier-Villars & Forelle, supra note 36. 
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Corporation (“Irish Bank”).46 After the situation failed to im-
prove, Mr. Quinn was left bankrupt,47 and a number of interna-
tional investors purchased Irish Bank’s distressed assets.48 
Kennedy Wilson, a global real estate investment and services 
firm based in the United States, purchased €1.6 billion of dis-
tressed residential housing developments from Bank of Ire-
land’s portfolio.49 U.S.-based State Street Global Advisors in-
creased its assets under management by US$36 billion when it 
purchased Bank of Ireland Asset Management for €57 mil-
lion.50 Similarly, U.S.-based real estate giant CB Richard Ellis 
purchased ING Real Estate Investment Management from the 
ING Group of the Netherlands.51 
Even for buyers within the Eurozone, distressed deals for 
state-owned assets created new opportunities. In June 2011, 
Germany-based Deutsche Telekom AG increased its ownership 
in Greece’s Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA by 
10% for €400 (approximately US$590 million).52 In comparison, 
Deutsch Telekom had spent nearly €4 billion since 2008 to ac-
quire its existing 30% stake.53 Likewise, Fraport AG, a German 
company that owns or manages twelve airports around the 
world, announced interest in acquiring a 55% stake in Athens 
International Airport.54 Further, Czech power company CEZ 
AS indicated in April 2011 its interest in acquiring an equity 
position in Greece’s largest power supplier, Public Power Corp., 
as Greek officials sought to reduce debt levels through state-
owned asset sales.55 
                                                                                                                         
 46. Colm Heatley & Finbarr Flynn, Former Irish Billionaire Sean Quinn 
Declared Bankrupt, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-16/former-irish-billionaire-sean-
quinn-declared-bankrupt-1-.html. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See SPECIAL REPORT: End of an Eire, PERE MAG., July–Aug. 2011. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. In fairness to the analysis presented in Part III(B), CBRE likely re-
quires only a traditional, and not extraterritorial, application of 11 U.S.C. § 
541 for U.S. bankruptcy court jurisdiction. 
 52. Christopher Lawton & Laura Stevens, Bargain Hunting in Greece, 
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2011, at B10. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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II. INCENTIVES IN FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LITIGATION AND 
HOW SUCH INCENTIVES MAY CAUSE EUROZONE DEALS TO 
REPLICATE RECENT HISTORY 
A flurry of Eurozone distressed transfers creates a potential 
problem for foreign investors if two situations were to occur. 
First, the distressed party selling the assets would have to not 
survive either the immediate liquidity crisis or the broader 
economic rebalancing. This failure may initially take the form 
of an out-of-court restructuring, but could later result in a 
bankruptcy filing in U.S. courts under Chapters 11 or 15 of the 
Code. Second, the crisis that caused the opportunity reverses, 
and the market re-prices the asset at non-distressed levels. Af-
ter such a recovery, the hindsight view of the original transac-
tion appears significantly stilted—as if the distressed buyer 
pilfered the spoils of the unwilling seller and stole the crown 
jewels. 
Although this characterization of the distressed transaction 
tends to inflate the original balance of power, such a hindsight 
view often leads critics to impugn the actions of the “vulture 
investor.”56 Vultures, a pejorative term for distressed purchas-
ers, “are so named because they have a predilection for busi-
nesses that are dead or dying. . . . [Vultures are] betting that a 
company on its knees will once again stand up and resume 
walking.”57 The opinion of two such critics offended by a vul-
ture’s success is particularly important: the now-bankrupt sell-
er and its creditors. Significant rebounds in asset prices may 
lead the distressed seller, or the distressed seller’s creditors, to 
feel taken advantage of or even cheated. This potential situa-
tion may even discourage distressed purchasers from complet-
ing out-of-court transactions for fear that this unique form of 
“seller’s remorse” will incentivize avoidance actions.58 
Fraudulent transfer laws would appear, at least initially, to 
allay these reservations.59 The party seeking avoidance must 
                                                                                                                         
 56. See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 22 (1992). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See MOYER, supra note 10, at 201. 
 59. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2006); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT (UFTA) §§ 4–5 (1984). The UFTA serves as a reasonable proxy 
for most states’ fraudulent transfer laws, while 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides the 
standard for federal courts. 
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show that the consideration exchanged did not constitute “rea-
sonably equivalent value” under an actual, quasi, or construc-
tive fraudulent transfer theory.60 Each of these theories calcu-
lates “reasonably equivalent value” as it existed at the time of 
the transfer.61 Accordingly, a court must calculate value using 
industry valuation practices as of the time of the transfer. Such 
an analysis would likely preclude any recovery, even in dis-
tressed situations, because comparable transactions would 
usually provide a baseline for “reasonably equivalent value.”62 
But the potential to recover valuable assets with successful 
avoidance actions provides an incentive to test the bounds of 
reasonably equivalent value. 
The last three economic cycles have presented remarkably 
similar iterations of the situation described.63 None is more in-
dicative of the incentives behind avoidance actions than 
ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corporation.64 Before be-
coming what the Fifth Circuit described as “one of the most 
successful bankruptcies in the United States in history,”65 
                                                                                                                         
 60. ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 335 (S.D. Tex. 
2008). Actual fraud requires that “the debtor made the transfer or incurred 
the obligation . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor 
of the debtor.” UFTA § 4(a)(1). The other two theories require no such find-
ing. Quasi-constructive fraud occurs when a transaction makes “the remain-
ing assets of the debtor . . . unreasonably small in relation to the business or 
transaction.” UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i). Similarly, constructive fraud requires strict 
liability where a transfer is made for less than “reasonably equivalent value” 
and is made during or itself causes a debtor’s insolvency. UFTA § 5(a). 
 61. ASARCO, 396 B.R. at 337. 
 62. See id. at 355–57. 
 63. “During the globalization era, [the] . . . three bubbles and bursts . . . 
were Reagan’s junk-bond bubble, Clinton’s dot-com bubble, and Bush’s mort-
gage and housing bubble.” Chih Kwan Chen, The Rise and the Self-
Destruction of the Globalization Scheme, FORCASTGLOBALECONOMY.COM § 6 
(last updated Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://forcastglobaleconomy.com/ReviewForecast01/ReviewForecast01.htm. 
Describing the events leading to the late 1980s correction, vulture investor 
Harry Freund said, “[p]rices had gone up, everybody was rushing into [re-
structuring], and the values that we were used to were not evident. Every-
thing was just flooded with money, and ignorant money. Summer of 1989 
there was an implosion . . . .” ROSENBERG, supra note 56, at 23. 
 64. See ASARCO, 396 B.R. at 278. 
 65. ASARCO L.L.C. v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 702 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir. 
2012) (citations omitted). 
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Americas Smelting and Refining Company’s (“ASARCO”) bank-
ruptcy case was perhaps the largest and most complex envi-
ronmental reorganization to date.66 
For much of the twentieth-century, ASARCO was the leading 
copper producer in the United States.67 In 2005, faced with 
“[l]ow copper prices, labor strikes, environmental liabilities, 
asbestos claims,” and significant bond debts from a leveraged 
buyout, ASARCO sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in 
the Southern District of Texas.68 The centerpiece of the eventu-
al “100-cent plan”69 was ASARCO’s successful fraudulent con-
veyance claim against its parent corporation, Grupo Mexico, 
S.A.B. de C.V. (“Grupo”).70 ASARCO’s bankruptcy counsel, 
Baker Botts LLP, brought the avoidance action against Grupo 
to recover the “crown jewel” of ASARCO: a controlling equity 
interest in the Southern Peru Copper Company (“SPCC”).71 
Low copper prices had depressed the value of the SPCC inter-
est in 2001 after Grupo formed a no-asset company, Americas 
Mining Corporation (“AMC”), and pursued a leverage buyout of 
the interest.72 
In short, the SPCC transaction was fraught with complica-
tions stemming from ASARCO’s perilous financial condition 
and AMC’s/Grupo’s tactics to force a deal. Among these compli-
cations were that (1) ASARCO had stopped paying various 
creditors and had technically defaulted on its US$450 million 
revolver by October 2001;73 (2) Grupo had maneuvered to pre-
vent the advising investment banks from soliciting other offers 
                                                                                                                         
 66. In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2975882, at *6 (Bankr. 
S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011). 
 67. Judith Elkin, Recent Cases and Strategies That Impact Distressed 
Business Sales: Is it Worth the Headache?, in BUYING AND SELLING 
DISTRESSED BUSINESSES, *1, *15 (2010), available at 2010 WL 6425204. 
 68. Id. 
 69. A “100-cent” case is the rare case in bankruptcy where creditors re-
ceive full payment through the plan of reorganization. John Bittner et al., 
Anatomy of the “100 Cent+” Case, 25 ASS’N INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING 
ADVISORS 1, 1 (Aug.–Sept. 2011). ASARCO was one of these rare cases. See In 
re ASARCO LLC, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011). 
 70. ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 297–300 (S.D. 
Tex. 2008). 
 71. Id. at 297–98, 304. 
 72. Id. at 302–03. 
 73. Id. at 305–06. 
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for the SPCC equity;74 (3) certain ASARCO board members had 
been asked to resign after withdrawing their consent for the 
SPCC transaction;75 and (4) valuation opinions from several 
investment banks were conflicted on the enterprise value of the 
transaction.76 In fact, after one restructuring advisor attempted 
to withdraw its fairness opinion, ASARCO’s pre-bankruptcy 
restructuring counsel predicted the eventual fraudulent trans-
fer lawsuit.77 Despite the myriad of complications, the SPCC 
transaction closed on March 31, 2003.78 
During the period starting the day after the SPCC transac-
tion closed until the time of the fraudulent transfer proceeding, 
copper prices improved dramatically, rising from approximate-
ly US$0.71 per pound to more than US$3.50 per pound.79 The 
substantial improvement in copper prices buoyed the estimated 
value of the SPCC equity interest from an estimated US$811.4 
or US$853 million, to well over US$3 billion.80 Incentivized by 
the prospect of recovering the “crown jewel” asset, Baker Botts 
brought the fraudulent transfer proceeding to recover the 
SPCC interest on behalf of ASARCO’s creditors.81 Following a 
four-week bench trial, the district court entered a voluminous, 
186-page opinion and order unwinding the SPCC transaction.82 
The court concluded that the price paid for the SPCC interest 
constituted “reasonably equivalent value,” which defeated the 
constructive fraudulent transfer theory,83 but that the SPCC 
                                                                                                                         
 74. Id. at 308. 
 75. Id. at 313–14. 
 76. Id. at 307. 
 77. Id. at 312–13. 
 78. Id. at 313. 
 79. Id. at 303, 357. 
 80. See id. at 350, 355 (calculations made by author based on figures pro-
vided by the court). 
 81. Id. at 315. 
 82. Id. at 278–433. 
 83. Id. at 364. Over a span of forty pages, the court analyzed “reasonably 
equivalent value” extensively using three different common valuation meth-
ods: (1) Stock Price Valuation, (2) Market Transaction Multiples, and (3) Dis-
counted Cash Flow. Id. at 342. A stock price valuation applies a premium or 
discount to the historical trading averages of a public equity, but requires an 
efficient market to serve as a viable value indication. Id. at 342–45. Although 
the transaction multiple method is a common industry practice, it was not a 
good indication of the SPCC equity value because the complexities of the case 
eliminated the field of comparable transactions. Id. at 352–57, n.68. The 
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transaction was still avoidable as an “actual” fraudulent trans-
fer.84 
In addition to the incentive for debtors in avoidance actions, 
ASARCO provides an example of the incentive for the counsel 
of the debtor in possession to bring avoidance proceedings or 
take other actions to augment the estate.85 The Fifth Circuit 
affords bankruptcy courts the discretion to enhance attorneys’ 
fees in the rare and exceptional case where counsel accom-
plishes a substantial recovery for their clients that would not 
have otherwise occurred without their efforts.86 Based on the 
“significant hurdles” faced and the “rare and extraordinary” 
results produced,87 the bankruptcy court in ASARCO awarded 
Baker Botts a US$4 million fee enhancement for its successful 
avoidance of the SPCC transaction.88 Other firms received simi-
                                                                                                                         
court relied on the Discounted Cash Flow analysis, which considers the fu-
ture cash flows of an investment, to arrive at a valuation and applied a dis-
count rate to arrive at present value. Id. at 357–62. 
 84. Id. at 386. In addition to the statutory badges, the court considered 
suggested badges of fraud, including: (1) pilfering the “crown jewel” asset, (2) 
order of payment from proceeds, (3) remaining past due obligations left un-
paid, (4) ability to pay other creditors, and (5) competitive bidding and sale to 
highest bidder. Id. at 374–78. 
 85. See In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, *35–37 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011). 
 86. CRG Partners Grp., L.L.C. v. Neary (In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.), 690 
F.3d 650, 652–53 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming a fee enhancement of 16%); Lawl-
er v. Teofan (In re Lawler), 807 F.2d 1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming 
fee enhancement at factor of 1.7 over the lodestar); Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v. 
Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1980) (enhancing fees by 16%); Wolf v. 
Frank, 555 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (enhancing fees by 33%); but cf. 
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1676–77 (2010) (denying 
“arbitrary” fee enhancement of 75% in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983). The bankruptcy court in ASARCO distinguished Perdue, saying that 
“a civil-rights case that does not even contain the word ‘bankruptcy’” should 
not displace “decades of established bankruptcy jurisprudence.” In re 
ASARCO, 2011 WL 2974957, at *36. The Fifth Circuit likewise rejected Per-
due as an absolute bar to fee enhancements in bankruptcy, noting in another 
matter in the ASARCO case that “enhancements are possible in situations 
not delineated by Perdue.” Pilgrim’s Pride, 690 F.3d at 664. 
 87. In re ASARCO, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4, *7. 
 88. Id. at *37. Baker Botts’ total fees for the ASARCO case, including the 
fee enhancement, exceeded US$117 million. Id. at *41. The court calculated 
the fee enhancement by applying a 10% increase to the 58,781.2 hours alone 
that Baker Botts’ attorneys spent on the SPCC fraudulent transfer litigation. 
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lar fee enhancements for asbestos litigation in which claimants 
received a settlement of almost US$1 billion.89 These fee en-
hancements were upheld by the district court90 and were pend-
ing a decision on appeal to the Fifth Circuit at the time of pub-
lication.91 
ASARCO demonstrates that foreigners facing litigation in 
U.S. courts may risk losing their sweetheart deal and having 
damages or fee enhancements assessed.92 Depending on the 
assets exchanged in distressed Eurozone transactions, im-
provements in the broader economic climate or even intermit-
tent liquidity fixes may create similar financial incentives as 
rising copper prices did in ASARCO. Likewise, the size of the 
transactions discussed in ASARCO, presumably comparable to 
those in the Eurozone, provide significant incentives for debt-
ors and their creditors to challenge the two and half hurdles. 
III. THE TWO AND A HALF HURDLES TO U.S. ADJUDICATION OF 
FOREIGN FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS 
Distressed Eurozone opportunities, counterparty failures, 
and improving economics may all serve to create incentives 
similar to those in ASARCO to bring avoidance actions. The 
opportunity appears to be ripe, but the question remains: Can 
U.S. bankruptcy courts exercise both jurisdiction and constitu-
tional authority to act? First, litigants must demonstrate that 
the failures of the 2005 Amendments to the Code, which added 
Chapter 15, allow courts to shun cooperation in cross-border 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at *37 n.103. The debtor in possession originally approved a fee enhance-
ment for Baker Botts of US$22.64 million, but the bankruptcy court reduced 
the award upon challenge of the reorganized debtor. Sealed Brief for Baker 
Botts, LLP at 35, ASARCO LLC v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, 
PC (In re ASARCO LLC), No. 12-40997 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013). 
 89. In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2975882, at *12–13 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011). 
 90. ASARCO LLC v. Baker Botts, LLP (In re ASARCO LLC), 477 B.R. 661, 
665 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Largest Fee Enhancement in U.S. Bankruptcy History 
Affirmed on Appeal, BAKER BOTTS (Oct. 24, 
2012), http://www.bakerbotts.com/largest-fee-enhancement-in-us-bankruptcy-
history-affirmed-on-appeal-10-24-2012/. 
 91. See ASARCO LLC v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, PC (In 
re ASARCO LLC), No. 12-40997 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 24, 2012). 
 92. See In re ASARCO, 2011 WL 2975882, *12–13. 
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insolvencies, contrary to statutory guidance.93 Empirical evi-
dence suggests this argument creates only a “half hurdle.”94 
After they prove that Chapter 15 does not preclude U.S. ad-
judication, litigants must prove that the Code otherwise allows 
courts to reach foreign transactions. A split over whether bank-
ruptcy courts may apply the Code extraterritorially has devel-
oped since the addition of Chapter 15 in 2005.95 As of yet, the 
Supreme Court has denied the opportunity to settle the dis-
pute.96 Thus, the extraterritoriality hurdle would require care-
fully choosing the proper forum and then successfully arguing 
that U.S. courts’ jurisdiction under the Code extends beyond 
the territorial borders of the United States. 
The final hurdle to adjudication in U.S. bankruptcy courts is 
whether these courts have constitutional authority to deter-
mine fraudulent transfer actions of foreign property. The Su-
preme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall97 revived a 
formalist approach to the separation of powers regarding bank-
ruptcy courts’ constitutional authority.98 While litigants have 
struggled to reconcile its impact on domestic fraudulent trans-
                                                                                                                         
 93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006). 
 94. See Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empir-
ical Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, EXPRESSO 25 
(2010), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jeremy_le
ong (characterizing Chapter 15 as a hypocritical “setback rather than a step 
forward for international cooperation in insolvency law”). 
 95. Compare French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 151–52 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (applying § 541(a) and § 547 in-
ternationally), with Barclay v. Swiss Fin. Corp. (In re Bankr. Estate of Mid-
land Euro Exch. Inc.), 347 B.R. 708, 717–18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing 
to apply § 541(a) and § 548 internationally). 
 96. See French, 549 U.S. at 815. 
 97. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 98. See Tim S. Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer to the Anna Nicole Smith 
Saga in Stern v. Marshall Leaves Bankruptcy World Asking Questions, 
BEHIND THE BENCH (Ass’n Bankr. Jud. Assistants), Sept. 2011, at 3 [hereinaf-
ter Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer]. See generally Omar J. Alaniz, Navi-
gating Through the Post-Stern World: A Comprehensive Survey of All Cases 
Meaningfully Discussing Stern v. Marshall (Nov. 8–9, 2012) [hereinafter Ala-
niz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World] (presentation at 31st Annual 
Jay L. Westbrook Bankruptcy Conference), available at 
http://utcle.org/elibrary/get-asset-file/asset_file_id/44751/preview/1. 
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fer actions,99 Stern also provides the final hurdle for U.S. bank-
ruptcy courts to reach foreign transactions without offending 
Article III. 
A. The Half Hurdle of Chapter 15 of Title 11. 
Congress created the first hurdle to U.S. courts’ jurisdiction 
with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).100 Among other 
significant changes to the Code, BAPCPA added the much-
anticipated Chapter 15, which created new protocols for han-
dling cross-border insolvency cases.101 Chapter 15 integrated 
many of the changes proposed by the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in its Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.102 UNCITRAL’s Model Law 
was intended to encourage a universalist approach to cross-
board insolvencies and to promote continuity and predictability 
between courts in different countries.103 
Before BAPCPA’s passage, many U.S. bankruptcy scholars 
argued that international bankruptcies should not incorporate 
a universalist principle.104 Professor Lynn LoPucki has advo-
cated for a territorialist approach, which would limit a coun-
try’s judicial powers to enforcement only within its territorial 
                                                                                                                         
 99. See Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision 
(Part I), 17 BANKR. LITIG. (A.B.A. Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Feb. 15, 
2012, at 21–34, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter
2012-survey-interpreting-stern.html [hereinafter Alaniz, A Survey of Cases 
Interpreting the Stern Decision] (listing cases with both narrow and expan-
sive views of Stern). 
 100. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 801–02, 119 Stat. 23, 134–46. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, Annex, art. 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998). 
 103. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006) (“[T]he court shall cooperate to the maxi-
mum extent possible with a foreign court . . . .”). For further discussion of 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law and its application in U.S. bankruptcies, see Timo-
thy S. Springer, Note, Paved with Good Intentions: Creditors Face a New 
Roadblock to Recovery in Mexican Bankruptcies, 18 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 83, 
90–93 (2012) [hereinafter Springer, Paved with Good Intentions]. 
 104. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in 
International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2216–17 (2000). 
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borders.105 While supporting a theory of universalism, another 
prominent U.S. bankruptcy scholar, Professor Jay L. West-
brook, has acknowledged that “it seems unrealistic to think 
that universalism will be accepted absent roughly similar 
laws.”106 UNCITRAL’s Model Law would appear to address 
Professor Westbrook’s later qualification by creating harmoni-
ous laws among different territorial jurisdictions. But to affect 
a truly universalist change, all jurisdictions that might be 
forced to cooperate by cross-border insolvencies must have first 
adopted either the Model Law or laws otherwise comparable.107 
As of January 2012, only nineteen countries have adopted the 
Model Law, with China and India conspicuously absent from 
the list.108 
The United States has begun harmonizing its bankruptcy 
procedures with other international jurisdictions,109 but Chap-
ter 15 does not provide a clear answer to U.S. courts’ ability to 
reach distressed Eurozone transactions. BAPCPA and Chapter 
15 improved U.S. recognition of proceedings and the ability of 
U.S. courts to apply foreign law to U.S. proceedings.110 But 
“neither Chapter 15 nor any other part of the Code extensively 
covers the opposite question—the degree to which U.S. courts 
can apply U.S. bankruptcy provisions abroad.”111 
Empirical evidence suggests that Chapter 15 may not be “as 
universalist as its proponents claim it to be.”112 In fact, the evi-
dence suggests that Chapter 15 may be an ineffective solution 
“to resolve conflicting priority rules between the United States 
and foreign proceedings.”113 In one sense, “Chapter 15 . . . does 
not significantly further cooperation because it applies only to 
                                                                                                                         
 105. Id. 
 106. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolven-
cies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 485 (1991). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Status: 1997—UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_stat
us.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 109. See Springer, Paved with Good Intentions, supra note 103, at 90. 
 110. See Developments in the Law: VII. Chapter 15 and Cross-Border Bank-
ruptcy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1293 (2011). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Leong, supra note 94, at 8. 
 113. Id. at 9. 
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debtors already subject to a foreign proceeding.”114 Chapter 15 
also requires that a U.S. court determine whether its case is 
ancillary to a “foreign main proceeding,”115 which the Code de-
fines as “a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the 
debtor has the center of its main interests.”116 U.S. courts have 
“recognized foreign proceedings in almost every Chapter 15 
case” since BAPCPA’s passage in 2005,117 but empirical data 
indicates the courts have still withheld jurisdiction over some 
assets even after recognition in a vast majority of cases—77.3% 
to be precise.118 In only 9.1% of cases did the U.S. court entrust 
to foreign courts all distribution of estate assets where U.S. 
creditors were at stake.119 
The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed one example of a U.S. 
bankruptcy court applying U.S. law in contradiction to foreign 
law. The bankruptcy court in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. refused 
to enforce a confirmed concurso plan from a Mexican court.120 
The Mexican plan would have paid equity classes before more 
senior debt classes—a clear violation of the Absolute Priority 
Rule121—and released from claims by Vitro’s creditors several 
third party subsidiaries in the United States that were not a 
part of the bankruptcy case.122 In affirming the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                         
 114. Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1300. 
 115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1515 (2006) (outlining process to apply for recognition 
of Foreign Main Proceeding). 
 116. Id. § 1502(4). 
 117. Leong, supra note 94, at 7. 
 118. Id. at 8, 14–15, fig.1. The 77.3% figure comes from two categories. 
First, Leong’s findings show U.S. “courts granted entrustment in only 45.5% 
of cases where foreign proceedings were recognized.” Id. at 7. Second, “[w]hen 
such entrustment was granted, 31.8% of cases were accompanied by qualify-
ing factors,” which included imposing U.S. priority laws or requiring assur-
ances such priority distribution schemes would be followed. Id. at 1. 
 119. Id. at 14. 
 120. See Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de 
C.V.), 473 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ad Hoc 
Group of Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 121. The Absolute Priority Rule requires that claimants with higher priori-
ty in a Chapter 11 case must be paid in full before claimants with junior pri-
ority can be paid in a plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) 
(2006). 
 122. See Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 473 B.R. at 131–33. 
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court’s denial of confirmation,123 the Fifth Circuit has provided 
an example of U.S. courts applying U.S. law and shunning for-
eign law. 
The empirical and substantive evidence of U.S. courts retain-
ing control illustrate the inability of Chapter 15 to address 
whether U.S. courts can apply U.S. bankruptcy laws extraterri-
torially. Even in situations where a Eurozone debtor is subject 
to a foreign proceeding, the current trend since BAPCPA’s pas-
sage indicates that U.S. courts would not willingly part with 
jurisdiction without some baseline qualifications.124 Where no 
such proceeding exists, litigants in future avoidance actions 
involving Eurozone distressed assets will therefore face only a 
“half” hurdle to convincing a U.S. court to apply jurisdiction in 
light of Chapter 15. But litigants must subsequently address 
the more daunting hurdle—explaining the statutory and con-
stitutional authority for extraterritorial jurisdiction in bank-
ruptcy courts amidst the confusion surrounding questions left 
unanswered by Chapter 15. 
B. The U.S. Circuit Split Over the Extraterritorial Application 
of Title 11 
Following the passage of BAPCPA and Chapter 15, U.S. 
courts have maintained the ability to apply U.S. law to issues 
involving foreign-based property. Courts are generally faced 
with two questions before they are able to apply U.S. law out-
side of its territorial borders: (1) Can the statute be applied ex-
traterritorially, and (2) Does such an application violate princi-
ples of international comity?125 For U.S. courts to reach dis-
tressed Eurozone transactions, litigants must prove both that 
Congress intended for the federal law to apply extraterritorial-
ly and that the intrusion into international affairs does not vio-
late comity between U.S. law and Eurozone law.126 
                                                                                                                         
 123. Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders, 701 F.3d at 1069. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed on the grounds that “the Bankruptcy Code precludes non-consensual, 
non-debtor releases,” and thus did not reach the question of whether the con-
curso plan “would be manifestly contrary to the fundamental public policy of 
the United States.” Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006). 
 126. See id. 
1130 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
   1. Analysis of Statutory Jurisdiction 
It is well settled that “Congress has the authority to enforce 
its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United 
States.”127 In addition, it is presumed that “when it desires to 
do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the 
jurisdictional reach of a statute.”128 A presumption thus exists 
“that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, 
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”129 This presumption may be overcome by some 
“clearly expressed purpose” to apply the law extraterritorial-
ly,130 demonstrated by the three-factor test the Supreme Court 
announced in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.131 This test pro-
vides that the courts must review the statutory language, the 
statute’s legislative history, and any administrative interpreta-
tions of the statute.132 
Section 541 of the Code defines what property and interests 
belonging to a debtor constitute the bankruptcy estate over 
which the court has custody.133 Applying the Foley Brothers fac-
tors, the operative language of § 541 provides that as of the 
commencement of a case under Title 11, the estate “is com-
prised of all the following property, wherever located and by 
whomever held.”134 Congress amended § 70a of the Bankruptcy 
Act, the predecessor of § 541, in 1952 to include the phrase 
“wherever located.”135 The House Report connected with the 
amendment explained that the phrase makes “clear that a 
trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the title of the bankruptcy 
in property which is located without, as well as within, the 
                                                                                                                         
 127. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley 
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949)). 
 128. Id. at 258 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerado Hess Shipping 
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)). 
 129. Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285). 
 130. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286. 
 131. Id. at 285–88. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). 
 134. Id. § 541(a) (emphasis added). 
 135. See Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy Legislation of 1962, 4 B.C. INDUS. 
& COM. L. REV. 241, 241, 247 (1963) (citing Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66 Stat. 420, 
429–30 (1952)), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol4/iss2/1. 
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United States.”136 Legislative reports from the 1978 reforms 
give less specific guidance, seemingly incorporating by refer-
ence all property included under § 70a of the Bankruptcy 
Act.137 Congress’s failure to retreat from the 1952 report in ei-
ther 1972 or any of the subsequent amendments would appear 
to indicate a tacit adoption. The third Foley Brothers factor 
does not apply in a § 541 analysis because no agency interpre-
tations are available.138 
Despite the apparent extraterritorial application of § 541 us-
ing the Foley Brothers factors, courts remain split as to wheth-
er § 541 may apply extraterritorially to incorporate foreign-
based property.139 The dispute centers around whether the 
widely recognized extraterritorial application of § 541 also in-
cludes the trustee’s avoidance powers under § 548.140 The aca-
demic community has articulated eloquent arguments for both 
sides of the debate.141 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not 
                                                                                                                         
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 82-2320, at 15 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1960, 1976 (emphasis added). 
 137. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323. 
 138. T. Brandon Welch, The Territorial Avoidance Power of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 553, 553 (2008). 
 139. Compare French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 151–52 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (applying § 541(a) and § 547 in-
ternationally), with Barclay v. Swiss Fin. Corp. (In re Bankr. Estate of Mid-
land Euro Exch. Inc.), 347 B.R. 708, 717–18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing 
to apply § 541(a) and § 548 internationally). 
 140. See, e.g., Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Si-
mon), 153 F.3d 991, 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding § 541 applies extraterri-
torially); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Hanseatic Marine Serv. (In re Lykes 
Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding the same); 
Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(holding the same). 
 141. Compare Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 104 (advocating territorialist 
approach), and Welch, supra note 138, at 563–65 (also advocating territorial-
ist approach), with Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy 
Transactions in Multinational Bankruptcy Cases, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 899, 915 
(2007) (advocating universalist approach), and David M. Green & Walter 
Benzija, Spanning the Globe: The Intended Extraterritorial Reach of the 
Bankruptcy Code, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 109–10 (2002) (also advo-
cating universalist approach). 
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yet spoken, instead rejecting the opportunity to settle the cir-
cuit split over the Code’s extraterritorial application.142 
As a result, courts remain split over whether the language of 
§ 541 incorporates foreign transferred property pre-petition.143 
The Fifth Circuit has twice held that the trustee’s strong-arm 
powers under Title 11 may be applied extraterritorially 
through § 541, either because the estate retains an equitable 
interest in fraudulently transferred property,144 or because the 
estate regains an equitable interest in fraudulently transferred 
property following a § 550 recovery order.145 Although the Fifth 
Circuit’s logic has been criticized as circular,146 at least one 
court has concluded that because fraudulent transfers involve 
transitory law, such actions may be brought wherever personal 
jurisdiction has been established.147 
2. Analysis of International Comity 
In addition to concerns about § 548 importing extraterritori-
ality from § 541, litigants must also address principles of inter-
                                                                                                                         
 142. French, 440 F.3d 145. It is possible that the Supreme Court has yet to 
rule on extraterritoriality in this context for fear that such a ruling would 
violate the separation of powers. See Welch, supra note 138, at 559 n.51. Also 
of note, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in French before deciding Morri-
son v. National Bank of Australia, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), a case in which the 
Supreme Court “swiftly swept away a half-century of lower courts treating 
the issue of extraterritorial reach of the securities law as a question of subject 
matter jurisdiction.” Jared L. Kopel et al., Current Topics on Securities Liti-
gation, in 1850 PRACTISING L. INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK 
SERIES 365, 391 (2010). 
 143. Compare Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102 
F.2d 1411, 1415–16 (5th Cir. 1997), and Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. Mort-
gageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1273 & 
n.7, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1983), with Welch, supra note 138, at 563 (citing Bar-
clay, 347 B.R. at 718) (“Irrespective of the extraterritorial application of § 
541, foreign transferred property is not within the estate.”). 
 144. See Cullen, 102 F.3d at 1415–16. 
 145. See MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1273 & n.7. 
 146. See Welch, supra note 138, at 563–64 (stating that the argument that 
fraudulently transferred property is within bankruptcy court’s in rem author-
ity “simply assumes what it seeks to prove. Without adopting this circular 
argument, extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot be premised on notions of do-
mestic jurisdiction”). 
 147. Diaz-Barba v. Kismet Acquisition, LLC, No. 08CV1446, 2010 WL 
2079738, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2010). 
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national comity. Courts look to factors such as, (1) the regula-
tions and laws of the potentially conflicting foreign territory; 
(2) the connection and economic activities between the parties 
and this territory; (3) the likelihood of conflict of laws; and 
(4) the foreign territory’s interest in regulating the transac-
tion.148 At least one court has required that an actual conflict 
between foreign and domestic law exist in order to violate in-
ternational comity.149 Moreover, Chapter 15 would appear to 
settle concerns about international comity and provide statuto-
ry cover for courts to reach Eurozone transactions, at least on 
its face, especially if the foreign jurisdiction has adopted 
UNCINTRAL’s Model Law and embraced universalism. 
3. Alternative Options to Overcoming the Extraterritoriality 
Hurdle 
If litigants are unable to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality using the Foley Brothers factors, one option 
remains—prove that the presumption never arose. First, the 
presumption does not arise if the transfer occurred in the Unit-
ed States.150 As many transactions touch several territorial ju-
risdictions simultaneously, some courts avoid the presumption 
if the United States was the “center of gravity.”151 Likewise, the 
presumption does not arise if the property recovered was al-
ready considered part of the estate, either through an action 
under 11 U.S.C. § 549,152 or by a convincing argument extend-
ing the inclusion date for the property before the petition 
date.153 
                                                                                                                         
 148. See French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (discussing the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States § 403 (1987)). 
 149. Diaz-Barba, 2010 WL 2079738, at *11. 
 150. Id. at *7 (citing Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 
987 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 151. See David B. Stratton, Reflections on the Extraterritorial Application of 
the Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 44, 73 (2005). 
 152. Diaz-Barba, 2010 WL 2079738, at *4, *10 (determining that no pre-
sumption arose because, although transfer occurred post-petition, the trans-
feree was debtor’s alter ego, the transfer applied nunc pro tunc, and the 
transferred property was considered part of the estate). 
 153. See West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care—
Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (concluding that prop-
erty transferred during the preference period was effectively property of the 
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Litigants may also argue that the presumption against extra-
territoriality does not arise in bankruptcy proceedings because 
bankruptcy is materially different from other legal contexts 
and requires special consideration.154 In French, one judge con-
curred to emphasize his view that the Supreme Court’s “strong 
presumption against extraterritoriality” remained “intact” after 
the panel’s decision.155 Judge Wilkinson distinguished prior 
precedent because, in the context of anti-discrimination or 
hourly wage laws, “ease of administration is not the raison 
d’être, and congressional intent for extraterritorial application 
is considerably less clear.”156 As a result, litigants must argue 
that bankruptcy should be considered separately, and not be 
grounds “to set forth general pronouncements on extraterrito-
riality.”157 
Finally, litigants seeking to reach Eurozone transactions may 
be able to use the Affiliate Rule to file in a circuit willing to ex-
ercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. This rule allows a compa-
ny to file either in the jurisdiction of its principal place of busi-
ness,158 or in that of an affiliated company.159 Of course, the 
rule cannot be used offensively to establish business in a favor-
able jurisdiction solely for the purpose of filing bankruptcy,160 
but it “is the rare case, indeed, in which a debtor’s business 
does not have some international aspect.”161 In the age of global 
business operations, the Affiliate Rule casts a wide-enough net 
to reach most major U.S. jurisdictions for bankruptcy filings. 
If successful in overcoming the hurdles of Chapter 15 and ex-
traterritoriality, litigants will have gained access to, at the 
minimum, U.S. district courts. But the final hurdle will deter-
                                                                                                                         
estate, despite the transaction occurring as much as a year before bankruptcy 
in some cases). 
 154. French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 154–55 (4th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
 155. Id. at 155. 
 156. Id. (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006). 
 159. Id. § 1408(2). 
 160. See In re Reichmann Petroleum Corp., 364 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tex. 2007) (denying venue transfer where assets were acquired solely for 
purposes of manipulating venue). 
 161. Stratton, supra note 151, at 44 (emphasis added). 
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mine if litigants can obtain expedited treatment under the 
“rocket dockets” of U.S. bankruptcy courts. 
C. Questions of Bankruptcy Courts’ Constitutional Authority 
after Stern v. Marshall 
Once a litigant convinces a court to exercise jurisdiction ex-
traterritorially, the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in 
Stern v. Marshall162 may provide yet another constitutional 
hurdle. The Stern Court made clear that not every proceeding 
within a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is necessarily within 
its constitutional reach.163 In fact, although Stern considers the 
authority of bankruptcy courts, the decision “is not really a 
bankruptcy decision at all; it is a constitutional separation of 
powers decision.”164 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judi-
cial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”165 Bankruptcy judges are 
not Article III judges; they lack the hallmark characteristics of 
life tenure and salary protection.166 Instead, bankruptcy judges’ 
powers come from Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which em-
powers Congress “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the sub-
ject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”167 As a re-
sult, bankruptcy courts exercising the judicial power of the 
United States would constitute one branch of the government 
aggrandizing its powers to the detriment of another branch, 
violating the separation of powers.168 Although money and job 
security may appear to be insignificant reasons for such a dis-
                                                                                                                         
 162. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 163. See id. at 2608. 
 164. George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankrupt-
cy Act’s Summary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. & 
PRAC., no. 1, Jan. 2012, at 1. 
 165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 166. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01. 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 168. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (rejecting the one-house 
veto as unconstitutional because it aggrandized the powers of the legislative 
branch to the detriment of the executive branch, thus violating the separa-
tion of powers). 
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tinction, the Framers of the Constitution recognized that these 
two features protect the courts from tyranny.169 
The Stern Court held a non-Article III court violated the sep-
aration of powers by entering a final order in a common law 
case reserved for Article III courts.170 Although the holding in 
Stern was self-limiting,171 “a maelstrom of opinions and articles 
have been written about the scope of Stern, ranging in tone 
from ‘much ado about nothing’ to ‘the end of the bankruptcy 
world as we know it.’”172 Caught squarely in the middle is 
whether bankruptcy courts have authority to enter final orders 
in fraudulent transfer actions. 
1. Statutory Framework for Bankruptcy Courts’ Jurisdiction 
To explain the implications of Stern, some discussion of the 
authority allocation between district courts and bankruptcy 
courts is necessary. Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers 
Congress to create laws regarding the debtor-creditor relation-
ship in bankruptcy.173 Congress exercised its Article I powers in 
1978 to replace the then-existing Bankruptcy Act with the pre-
sent Bankruptcy Code.174 Like other federal courts, bankruptcy 
courts’ jurisdiction is therefore “grounded in, and limited by, 
statute.”175 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern 
Pipeline v. Marathon,176 Congress revisited the bankruptcy al-
                                                                                                                         
 169. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 170. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609. 
 171. See id. at 2620 (“We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated re-
spect, exceeded” its authority.) (emphasis added); see also In re Salander 
O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115–16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Stern is 
replete with language emphasizing that this ruling should be limited to the 
unique circumstances of that case . . . .”). 
 172. BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 462 
B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 174. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006). 
 175. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995). 
 176. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 
(1982) (rejecting Congress’s inclusion of common law matters within bank-
ruptcy court’s plenary powers). 
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location scheme and restructured jurisdictional allocations un-
der Title 28.177 
Under the revised allocation framework, federal district 
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction for all cases aris-
ing under Title 11.178 Section 157(a) provides statutory authori-
ty for district courts to refer jurisdiction to the bankruptcy 
courts for those cases falling “under title 11 and any or all pro-
ceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case 
under title 11.”179 By way of referral, bankruptcy courts have in 
rem authority over “all the property, wherever located, of the 
debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of 
the estate.”180 District courts supervise referrals with the abil-
ity to withdraw the reference at any time by their own mo-
tions.181 
Even looking beyond the plain language of the referral stat-
ute, the Supreme Court has recognized that “Congress intend-
ed to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts 
so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all 
matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”182 Before her 
appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor defend-
ed this principle and noted that the Supreme Court and other 
courts “have broadly construed the jurisdictional grant in [the 
1984 Act].”183 Moreover, the express “language of § 1334(b) 
must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts un-
der § 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings 
involving the property of the debtor or the estate.”184 
Congress allocated original jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts 
to hear and determine proceedings concerning estate property 
                                                                                                                         
 177. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1329 and scat-
tered sections of Titles 26 and 28 of the U.S. Code). 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006). 
 179. Id. § 157(a) (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. § 1334(e). See also Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 
U.S. 440, 447–48 (2004) (“Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
a debtor’s property, wherever located, and over the estate.”). 
 181. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). 
 182. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. 
v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 183. Universal Oil Ltd. v. Allfirst Bank (In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.), 
419 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 184. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308. 
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that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11.185 “Arising 
in” jurisdiction pertains to matters that could only arise in a 
case under Title 11.186 By comparison, “arising under” jurisdic-
tion includes proceedings created by Title 11.187 Taken togeth-
er, actions “arising in” or “arising under” comprise core pro-
ceedings within bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction.188 Bankruptcy 
courts may hear and determine these core matters and enter 
final orders, which are subject to appellate review by the dis-
trict court under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.189 
2. Why Stern Creates a Problem for the Current Framework 
Instead of “arising in” or “arising under” jurisdiction, Stern 
involved only the third type of original bankruptcy court juris-
diction under § 157(a): proceedings “related to” the bankrupt-
cy.190 A proceeding invokes “related to” jurisdiction when the 
“action is related to bankruptcy [in that] the outcome could al-
ter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of ac-
tion.”191 Put simply, “a civil proceeding is related to a [T]itle 11 
case if the action’s outcome might have any conceivable effect 
on the bankrupt estate.”192 “Related to” jurisdiction stands on 
an opposite edge of the jurisdictional canyon from core proceed-
ings allocated under § 157(b)(1). Proceedings invoking only “re-
lated to”—and not “arising in” or “arising under”—jurisdiction 
are not core proceedings.193 Absent consent of the parties under 
§ 157(c)(2), the statute at most authorizes bankruptcy courts in 
“related to” proceedings to submit proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to the district court for a de novo review.194 
                                                                                                                         
 185. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(b)(1), 157(b)(2)(A). 
 186. See Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748, 752 
(5th Cir. 2010). 
 187. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); Schatz v. Chase Home Fin. (In re Schatz), 452 
B.R. 544, 551 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011). 
 188. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604–05 (2011). 
 189. See id. at 2604 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158; BANKR. R. PROC. 8013). 
 190. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 191. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (quoting Pacor, 
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 192. Parmalat Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 639 F.3d 572, 579 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 193. Cf. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605 (defining core proceedings as “arising in” 
or “arising under” Title 11). 
 194. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
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Stern involved a dispute over a considerable inheritance, and 
a widow’s attempt to recover in bankruptcy court for a tort 
claim against her late husband’s son.195 The tort claim was not 
predicated on the bankruptcy, meaning it neither arose nor 
was it tried exclusively in connection with a case under Title 
11.196 Therefore, because of the conceivable effect on the estate, 
§ 157(c) should have allocated jurisdiction over the purely 
state-law counterclaim under the “related to” or non-core 
framework.197 But because Congress included counterclaims by 
the estate in the non-exhaustive list of core proceedings in the 
1984 Act,198 the bankruptcy court relied on this list to enter a 
final order.199 
The Stern Court rejected the defunct label under 
§ 157(b)(2)(C) for state law counterclaims as core proceedings, 
but declared only this narrow sub-provision to be unconstitu-
tional.200 Absent consent, which the Court determined was not 
given for the counterclaim,201 the bankruptcy court’s only au-
thority under the § 157 allocation scheme was to submit pro-
posed findings to the district court.202 Even assuming that the 
Court’s holding in Stern affected proceedings that did not in-
voke solely “related to” jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court may 
still hear and determine such matters after Stern with the con-
sent of the parties.203 Chief Justice Roberts defined “core pro-
ceedings [as] those that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Ti-
tle 11.”204 Thus the Court is referring to the only remaining 
original bankruptcy jurisdiction—”related to”—when it states, 
“parties may consent to entry of final judgment by [a] bank-
ruptcy judge in non-core case.”205 The Court neither rejected 
                                                                                                                         
 195. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 196. Id. at 2618; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
 197. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
 198. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
 199. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 200. See id. at 2608, 2620. 
 201. See id. at 2614. 
 202. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1). 
 203. E.g., Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 781–83 
(D. Colo. 2011); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, 457 B.R. 692, 699–700 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 204. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 205. Id. at 2607 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)). 
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any other core proceeding under § 157(b), nor renounced bank-
ruptcy courts’ ability to hear and submit proposals and conclu-
sions under the § 157(c)(1) allocation scheme.206 
What the Stern decision has done is to revive arguments over 
significant dicta in the decision of Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg.207 The Supreme Court in Granfinanciera held that a 
foreign party subjected to a fraudulent transfer action retained 
the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because 
the proceeding was legal, not equitable, and because it closely 
mirrored a common law action.208 Although it decided the case 
on Seventh Amendment grounds, the Court indicated that the 
fraudulent transfer action was a private and not public right, 
despite arising under Title 11.209 The opinion in Granfinanciera 
echoed many of the Supreme Court’s earlier concerns in Mara-
thon about non-Article III courts and the scope of public 
rights,210 although it specifically rejected any limitation that 
would have mandated that the federal government be a party 
in all cases involving public rights.211 
                                                                                                                         
 206. See, e.g., Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 459 B.R. 298, 
300 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (upholding § 157(c)(1)); Adams Nat’l Bank v. 
GB Herdon & Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herdon & Assocs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 148, 
160–66 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011) (denying debtor’s motion to reconsider removal 
after Stern because debtor had consented under § 157(c)(2)); In re Safety 
Harbor Resort & Spa, LLC, 456 B.R. 703, 715 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). But 
see Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012) (determining that bank-
ruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter judgment for fraud 
claims brought by the debtor, reasoning that the creditor’s objection on ap-
peal to bankruptcy court adjudication implicated private rights that could not 
be waived by a litigant). 
 207. 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
 208. Id. at 46–47, 50. 
 209. Id. at 56. 
 210. Compare id. at 53–54 (discussing “whether Article III allows Congress 
to assign adjudication of [a common law] cause of action to a non-Article III 
tribunal”), with N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 
50, 64–67 (1982) (discussing the same issue). 
 211. Compare Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53–54, with Stern v. Marshall, 
131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620–21 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that he 
would require the government to be a party for a fraudulent transfer to fit 
within the public rights exception). 
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3. How Lowers Courts Are Grappling with Stern’s Implications 
This revival of Granfinanciera, along with the maelstrom 
surrounding Stern, has created considerable consternation 
among bankruptcy courts and practitioners trying to grapple 
with its implications.212 In addressing Stern, lower courts of all 
levels have fallen into either the narrow, neutral, or expansive 
interpretive camps.213 Despite the self-limiting holding, one 
commentator advocating for an expansive view of Stern astute-
ly summarized his camp’s general sentiment: 
“Justice Breyer may not have been able to command a majori-
ty of the court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he 
has definitely been right about one thing: Justice Roberts’s 
statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v. Marshall 
decision ‘does not change all that much’ was either tongue-in-
cheek or decidedly incorrect.”214 
Within the context of fraudulent transfers brought under the 
Code, the expansive camp may have an argument that the 
progeny of Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern preclude ad-
judication in bankruptcy courts.215 
                                                                                                                         
 212. See Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note 98, 
at 2–3; Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer, supra note 98, at 1. 
 213. As of April 18, 2013, 1089 cases have cited Stern, including 480 dis-
cussing the decision. Of these 480 cases, 216 fall within the “narrow” camp, 
145 within the “expansive” camp, and 119 remain “neutral.” See Shepard’s® 
Report for Stern v. Marshall, LEXIS (Dec. 26, 2012), http://advance.lexis.com 
(search “131 S. Ct. 2594”; click “Shepardize®” button; then select “Citing De-
cisions” tab and display by “Grid”). For a detailed case chart analyzing cases 
that discuss Stern in a “meaningful way” from September 1, 2011 through 
October 15, 2012, see chart accompanying Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Inter-
preting the Stern Decision, supra note 99, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter
2012-survey-interpreting-stern-chart.pdf. 
 214. Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 (emphasis added). Although the facts of 
Stern were limited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the decision has broad implica-
tions on the other proceedings included in the non-exhaustive list under 
§ 157(b)(2), including fraudulent conveyances. See id. 
 215. Compare Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter LLP (In re Heller 
Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 360 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding bankruptcy court 
could not determine § 544 or § 548 proceeding), and McCarthy v. Wells Fargo 
Bank (In re El Atari), No. 1:11cv1090, 2011 WL 5828013, at *4–5 (E.D. Va. 
Nov. 18, 2011) (holding bankruptcy court could not determine § 548 proceed-
ing), with Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine both § 544(b) and § 548 
 
1142 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:3 
Several circuits have addressed Stern issues in bankruptcy 
and fraudulent transfer contexts.216 The Fifth Circuit held that 
Stern does not affect the jurisdictional allocation for magistrate 
courts,217 and later the circuit reemphasized its reasoning in a 
bankruptcy context.218 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit reject-
ed bankruptcy courts’ authority in an “arising in” proceeding 
                                                                                                                         
claims); Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 783–84 (D. 
Colo. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine only § 548 claims); and Gold-
stein v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re Universal Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 580 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine § 544 and § 549 
claims). 
 216. See, e.g., Exclusive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham 
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 561–65 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “bankruptcy 
courts ha[d] [constitutional] authority [only] to hear and enter proposed find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law in . . . fraudulent conveyance” claims 
against non-creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) because such claims did not 
fall within the public rights exception); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 
920–23 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding bankruptcy court lacked constitutional au-
thority to enter final judgment on state law fraud claims, but had authority 
to enter order disallowing and discharging the claims); Onkyo Eur. Elecs. 
GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694 
F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2012) (determining that bankruptcy court had constitu-
tional authority to rule on fraudulent transfer action and good faith transfer-
ee defense under state law where defendants had filed a proof of claim); Lov-
ald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 686 F.3d 885, 887 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (de-
clining to address whether Stern prevented bankruptcy court from issuing 
final order in turnover adversary proceeding); Pfizer Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Co.), 676 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding 
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction and constitutional authority to issue in-
junction over asbestos-related suits pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)); DiVitto-
rio v. HSBC Bank USA, NA (In re DiVittorio), 670 F.3d 273 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(concluding Stern did not affect constitutional authority of bankruptcy court 
to render decision in adversary proceeding involving failure to state a claim 
and waiver of rights under a loan agreement); Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, 
Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding bankruptcy court did 
not have constitutional authority to render final judgment in adversary pro-
ceeding for state law claims of improper medical patient disclosure because 
claims involved private rights). 
 217. See Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 
673 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2012). The statute allocating authority for magis-
trate courts is so similar to 28 U.S.C. § 157 in its application that a constitu-
tional decision on one is often viewed as affecting the other. See Kuney, supra 
note 164, at 8; Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note 
98, at 20–22. 
 218. See CRG Partners Group, LLC v. Neary (In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.), 
690 F.3d 650, 666–67 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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seeking damages provided for by a state statute regarding the 
disclosures of confidential medical records.219 And the Ninth 
Circuit recently issued an expansive reading of Stern, holding 
that a fraudulent conveyance claim against a non-creditor 
brought under 11 U.S.C. § 548 did not fall within the public 
rights exception220 and that a bankruptcy court was authorized 
only to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.221 
If bankruptcy courts can adjudicate fraudulent transfers af-
ter Stern, it will likely be through the public rights doctrine, a 
judicially created exception to Article III adjudication.222 The 
exception is linked to Congress’s Article I legislative powers.223 
Congress may except three types of powers from Article III de-
terminations: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and 
(3) cases involving public rights.224 Cases falling within these 
three categories “may be removed from [Article] III courts and 
delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for 
their determination.”225 Although the public rights doctrine 
was first applied to a dispute between the government and an 
individual,226 it has since been recognized to include actions 
where the government is not a formal party.227 Congress may 
create rights under a public regulatory scheme that bear “many 
of the characteristics of a public right,” even when the right is 
                                                                                                                         
 219. See Ortiz, 665 F.3d at 915. 
 220. Exclusive Benefits, 702 F.3d at 561. 
 221. Id. at 565. 
 222. But see id. at 564 (rejecting a public rights argument in a § 548 case). 
 223. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–94 
(1985). 
 224. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
64–67 (1982). Depending on the desired persuasion, parties may wish to de-
scribe public rights as a “doctrine” or “exception.” See id. at 67–69. 
 225. Id. at 70. 
 226. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 
283–85 (1855). 
 227. See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 585–86. Although the doctrine contin-
ued to be applied in similar procedural settings after Murray’s Lessee, the 
inquiry of whether a right is public, rather than private, is “not to mere mat-
ters of form but to the substance of what is required.” Id. at 586 (quoting 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)). Justice Scalia’s concurrence in 
Stern suggests that he would require the government to be a party for a 
fraudulent transfer to fit within the public rights exception. See Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620–21 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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asserted between individuals.228 Similarly, Congress may also 
“create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated 
into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate 
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article 
III judiciary.”229 When Congress creates such a statutory right, 
“it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that 
right must do so before particularized tribunals created to per-
form the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”230 
A plurality of the Stern Court distilled the test for the public 
rights exception to find that Congress may allocate adjudica-
tion of public rights that “derive[] from a federal regulatory 
scheme” or are “integrally related to a particular federal gov-
ernment action.”231 But Article III would serve little “purpose 
in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity 
of judicial decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal 
Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on 
entities outside Article III.”232 Accordingly, the Stern Court 
tempered any test for public rights with a broader historical 
test: “When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions 
at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, and 
is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the respon-
sibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in Ar-
ticle III courts.”233 Thus, jury trial rights attach when suits—
both “the mundane as well as the glamorous”234—involve the 
“stuff” of eighteenth-century common law actions, and Con-
gress may not withdraw such suits from Article III judicial 
cognizance.235 
                                                                                                                         
 228. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229. Id. at 594. 
 230. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83 
(1982). 
 231. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613 (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Na-
tion, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011)). 
 232. Id. at 2609. 
 233. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 
458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 234. Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39 (plurality opinion)). 
 235. See id. (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 
59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856)). 
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4. How the Questions Lingering After Stern Affect Potential 
Eurozone Litigation 
Bankruptcy courts’ constitutional authority to adjudicate 
fraudulent transfer actions to finality after Stern is in doubt 
because the Supreme Court itself has characterized fraudulent 
conveyance actions as “quintessentially suits at common 
law.”236 Parties advocating an expansive approach must argue 
that Article III and the Seventh Amendment, as discussed in 
Granfinanciera, preserve a jury trial right in these legal ac-
tions based in common law. As a result, these parties will ar-
gue that Congress may not simply “‘federalize’ and inoculate 
against Article III challenge[s]” such traditional common law 
proceedings “by enacting [them] as part of the Bankruptcy 
Code.”237 Such arguments have been made successfully in the 
debate over fraudulent transfers and 11 U.S.C. § 548.238 
In comparison, the “narrow” camp must argue that the multi-
party nature of bankruptcy cases and proceedings,239 as well as 
the fundamental differences between fraudulent transfer ac-
tions brought under § 544(b) and § 548 of the Code, provide a 
bright-line test.240 One crucial development has reemerged 
amid the post-Stern developments in the bankruptcy, district, 
and circuit courts as the silver bullet to bankruptcy court au-
thority—the target of a fraudulent conveyance action filing a 
proof of claim.241 A proof of claim, in effect, tethers a defendant 
                                                                                                                         
 236. Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989). 
 237. Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 n.64 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238. See, e.g., Exclusive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham 
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 561–65 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 239. See Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (differentiating multiparty nature of bankruptcy with two-
party nature of state law). 
 240. Section 548 gives a trustee standing to recover prepetition transfer 
under federal law. 11 U.S.C. § 548. In comparison, § 544(b) allows a trustee to 
avoid prepetition transfers using state law or other applicable non-
bankruptcy law by stepping into the shoes of a creditor holding an allowable 
unsecured claim. Id. § 544(b). As a result, the trustee may invoke § 544(b) to 
take advantage of longer statutes of limitation under state law. See Goldstein 
v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re Universal Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 580 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting distinction between § 544 and § 549, but concluding 
bankruptcy court had final-order authority). 
 241. See, e.g., Onkyo Eur. Elecs. GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re 
Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705, 722–23 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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to the bankruptcy court through 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), supplying 
“the bankruptcy court with authority to rule on the fraudulent 
transfer claim because the fraudulent transfer action becomes 
part of the debtor-creditor adjustment.”242 
Both camps may have to wait until the next constitutional 
challenge reaches the Supreme Court for unresolved questions 
from Stern to be settled.243 For now, foreign litigants dragged 
into U.S. bankruptcy courts may use Stern, the final hurdle to 
adjudication, as a sword. In particular, investment funds, in-
vestment banks, and other financial investors that are often 
the targets of suits by debtors may find the Stern lineage is 
best used offensively.244 Bankruptcy courts are known for effi-
ciently handling heavy dockets and, in a practical sense, things 
move faster in bankruptcy court.245 As a result, Stern “has be-
come the mantra of every litigant who, for strategic or tactical 
reasons, would rather litigate somewhere other than the bank-
ruptcy court.”246 
While foreign counterparties may desire “elsewhere” to be in 
another country, any Stern analysis would presume that the 
court has already decided to exercise jurisdiction extraterrito-
rially. As such, the Stern analysis affects only the division of 
labor between the U.S. federal district and bankruptcy courts, 
and not between courts in the United States and in the Euro-
zone. But as long as the debate over Stern and fraudulent 
transfers continues, foreign counterparties will face prolonged 
fights over constitutional authority;247 more time for decisions 
                                                                                                                         
 242. Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note 98, at 
10–11 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1966)). 
 243. See Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer, supra note 98. 
 244. See id. at 1; see also Robin E. Phelan et. al., The Peoples and the 
Courts Get Confuseder and Confuseder: Recent Ridiculous Rulings from 
Bankruptcyland 10 (Aug. 3, 2011) (CLE presentation to Dallas Bar Associa-
tion) (on file with author). 
 245. For a recent example of this reality, see In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 122, 
129 (3rd Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit refused to issue a writ of mandamus to 
overturn a bankruptcy court order that limited both parties’ time to present 
evidence to 7.5 hours in a breach of fiduciary duty case, holding only “that a 
post-judgment appeal is adequate to assure meaningful review of the proprie-
ty of the time-limit order.” Id. See also Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 n.69. 
 246. In re Ambac Fin. Grp., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, No. 
10-B-15973, 2011 WL 6844533 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011). 
 247. See Kuney, supra note 164, at 6–8. 
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to be appealed, references to be withdrawn, or judgments to be 
entered after the bankruptcy court’s submission of proposed 
findings;248 and demands for jury trials.249 Although these addi-
tional steps were often simply assumed before Stern,250 they 
will now cause foreign litigants to expend more time, money, 
and resources defending themselves in courts in which they 
never intended to litigate. 
CONCLUSION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE TWO AND A 
HALF HURDLES 
Each of these hurdles to U.S. adjudication will cause further 
argument and delay in cases, inevitably leading to more money 
spent.251 But arguments for and against adjudication that have 
been persuasive with many courts exist at each hurdle. Foreign 
counterparties must argue that the plain meaning of, and con-
gressional intent behind, Chapter 15 provides a clear directive 
for U.S. recognition of, and cooperation with, foreign proceed-
ings. In comparison, litigants seeking to obviate Chapter 15 
will argue that (1) ambiguity exists related to the United 
States exporting its laws;252 (2) domestic creditor interests are 
best protected in U.S. courts; or (3) express qualifications re-
quiring that U.S. law be applied elsewhere are necessary.253 
Alternatively, counterparties may argue that distressed Euro-
zone transactions are so egregious as to invoke Chapter 15’s 
exception for “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
United States,”254 although this exception requires a high 
standard of proof.255 
                                                                                                                         
 248. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), (d) (2006) (proposed findings and conclusions 
of law by bankruptcy courts require de novo review by district courts, and 
referrals to bankruptcy courts may be withdrawn at any time by the district 
court sua sponte “for cause shown”). 
 249. See Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64, 64 n.19 (1989). 
 250. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 
318, 320–21 (2011). 
 251. See Kuney, supra note 164, at 9. 
 252. See Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1293. 
 253. Leong, supra note 94, at 15. 
 254. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006). 
 255. Compare In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 638 n.16 
(Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109 (2005), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 183) (observing that this standard “has 
been narrowly interpreted by courts around the world” to mean violating “the 
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Regarding the extraterritoriality hurdle, several U.S. circuits 
have yet to rule on the extraterritorial powers of bankruptcy 
courts under the Code. Litigants seeking U.S. adjudication 
should use the Affiliate Rule offensively to select a favorable—
or at least neutral—circuit for filing.256 Such litigants must ar-
gue that the presumption never arose or, alternatively, that it 
has been overcome using the Foley Brothers factors. Foreign 
counterparties must argue that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541 and other statutes does not provide clear evidence that 
Congress intended for the Code to apply extraterritorially. 
Finally, parties litigating whether U.S. courts can adjudicate 
distressed Eurozone transactions must confront Stern v. Mar-
shall. Foreign counterparties must argue that fraudulent 
transfers, whether brought under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) or § 548, 
are “quintessentially suits at common law” and “paradigmatic 
private rights.”257 Courts will hear a melodic refrain that the 
Granfinanciera dicta indicates a right to Article III adjudica-
tion in fraudulent transfer proceedings.258 The chorus will echo 
that because fraudulent transfer proceedings invoke private 
rights, and thus require a jury trial, both Article III and the 
Seventh Amendment guarantee an audience before an Article 
III judge in an Article III court.259 
                                                                                                                         
most fundamental policies” of the host nation), with Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. 
ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), 473 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. N.D. 
Tex. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 
701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a Mexican plan of reorganiza-
tion that violated the Absolute Priority Rule and that extinguished guarantee 
claims of non-debtor subsidiary entities “manifestly contravene[d] the public 
policy of the United States and [was] also precluded from enforcement . . . ”). 
 256. For instance, although the Second Circuit has yet to rule on extraterri-
toriality, the Southern District of New York—one of the highest-volume 
bankruptcy dockets in the United States—has refused to apply 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547 extraterritorially, which would tend to discourage the Second Circuit as 
a viable forum for an extraterritorial argument. See Maxwell Comm’n Corp. 
v. Barclays Bank PLC (In re Maxwell Comm’n. Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 814 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d 1036 
(2nd Cir. 1996). 
 257. See Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989). 
 258. See id. at 64. 
 259. Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Statutory Lim-
its of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, at 1, 
6 (2011). 
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Conversely, counterparties arguing that bankruptcy courts 
have constitutional authority must rely on the public rights 
doctrine to justify Congress’s allocation of adjudication to non-
Article III courts. Counterparties must argue that the multi-
party aspects of bankruptcy260 and the differences between fed-
eral and state fraudulent transfer laws signify that an action 
under § 548 is not of the “stuff” of 1789. Alternatively, counter-
parties may be forced to distinguish § 544(b) as having the 
“stuff” of 1789 and re-focus the argument on separating § 548. 
In either instance, counterparties will seek to silence the Gran-
financiera hymn as inapposite dicta. U.S. courts are still in the 
midst of determining whether the Constitution permits adjudi-
cation of domestic property fraudulently transferred in bank-
ruptcy courts after Stern. But Stern has significant implica-
tions on the adjudication of foreign proceedings as well—a pro-
spect that U.S. courts may face in the near future. 
This extended analysis of distressed Eurozone deals reaching 
U.S. courts requires a number of economic and jurisprudential 
events to occur. But as the ASARCO case demonstrates, liti-
gants seeking strategic or tactical advantages are well incentiv-
ized to avail themselves of U.S. fraudulent transfer law. As 
austerity skirmishes give way to greater financial solidarity, 
the Eurozone will be both further protected, and yet paradoxi-
cally more exposed, to systemic and acute liquidity risks. Any 
number of financial scenarios may soon leave foreign counter-
parties subjected to opportunistic litigants preparing to chal-
lenge the two and a half hurdles to reach U.S. courts. 
                                                                                                                         
 260. See Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
